Concern for Burma (Myanmar)

Burmese movement to start true dialogue with NLD Daw Aung Sann Suu Kyi for democratic reform
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Thursday , October 20 , 2011

Thein Sein as Burma’s Gorbachev

Posted by witmone.singapore , Reader : 734 , 22:56:54

Asia Times on Line , October , 29 , 2011 By Andrew Selth Strategic analysts who studied the Soviet Union during the 1980s can still recall the excitement and intellectual challenge of trying to interpret developments as Mikhail Gorbachev first introduced his policy of perestroika (restructuring), and followed it two years later with glasnost (openness). As is now well known, there were some diehard Cold Warriors in official and academic circles who steadfastly refused to believe that a creature of the Communist Party, who had enjoyed the patronage of figures like KGB chief Yuri Andropov and risen to the rank of general secretary, would ever challenge the system that nurtured him. Then there were those experts who, on the basis of a careful analysis of the objective realities, were prepared to give Gorbachev the benefit of the doubt and accept that he was trying to introduce a range of genuine reforms, albeit for his own purposes. Few observers, however, went so far as to predict the downfall of the entire Soviet power structure. It is useful to keep that period in mind when looking at developments in Myanmar, also known as Burma, since the inauguration of a hybrid civilian-military government this January. President Thein Sein, a former army general widely believed to have been hand-picked by strongman Senior General Than Shwe, has made several public statements and promised a number of changes that appear to herald a more open-minded and conciliatory approach to government. There is no question that the armed forces intend to remain firmly in control of Myanmar, but there now appears to be the possibility of greater personal freedoms, rational economic policies and a more relaxed attitude towards the development of civil society. Thein Sein and his ministers have also taken a number of steps that seem designed in large part to meet the oft-repeated concerns of the international community. For example, the president has met with prominent opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has expressed herself "happy and satisfied" with his intention to introduce "real positive change". Over 200 political prisoners have been released, a move which addresses - to a certain extent at least - another major sticking point with the Western governments that maintain sanctions against the regime. Myanmar’s ambassador in Vienna has also assured the International Atomic Energy Agency that his country has neither the capacity nor the intention to develop nuclear weapons, long a subject of speculation and concern. These developments have prompted widely varying reactions. A number of respected academics and commentators have taken a strategic view and, with the usual caveats, sought to highlight what they believe to be the start of a gradual process of political reconciliation and incremental reform. The International Crisis Group has gone even further and announced that "major reform is under way" in Myanmar. A hard core of activists and their supporters, however, have dismissed recent developments as part of a massive confidence trick by an entrenched military regime. Focusing on more immediate issues, some have even called for harsher economic and financial sanctions against Naypyidaw. Given the dearth of reliable information about internal developments in Myanmar, and the highly politicized nature of the Myanmar-watching community, this divergence of views is not surprising. In another echo of the Cold War, when the academic community was deeply divided by ideological leanings and different approaches to professional contacts with the communist bloc, scholars and commentators have tended to split into two main camps. As The Economist opined recently, one sees the glass half full while the other sees the glass half empty. Some exchanges between the two sides have become quite heated, exposing an ugly side to the Myanmar debate. In the case of the Soviet Union, the optimists were ultimately proven correct, but even they failed to predict the full impact of Gorbachev’s revolutionary policies, and the power of the forces unleashed by his relaxation of the old rules. It is possible that the activist community is right, and the shift in Naypyidaw’s approach is simply a clever ploy to prompt the lifting of economic sanctions and to win Myanmar the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chair in 2014. Yet, if that is the plan, then Thein Sein seems to have forgotten Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous dictum that the most dangerous time for a dictatorship is when it begins to loosen its grip - for whatever reason. As Gorbachev found, once such a process is set in train, it is very difficult to control. There is another scenario that needs to be kept in mind. Notwithstanding the opaqueness of Myanmar’s politics, it is known that there are hardliners within the current leadership who oppose Thein Sein’s new approach, particularly his attempts at reconciliation with Aung San Suu Kyi and the pro-democracy movement. These elements favor continued strong military control of the country and the elimination of any dissent. Myanmar’s armed forces have been remarkably loyal and cohesive over the past 50 years, giving the country the world’s most durable dictatorship. A split in the ruling hierarchy is still unlikely, but if events are seen to be getting out of control an attempt to reinstate direct military rule cannot be ruled out. Faced with all this uncertainty, the key policy question faced by governments and international organizations is whether to take Thein Sein’s promises at face value and seek to encourage genuine reforms, or to dismiss recent developments as a sham and impose more punitive measures. To date, most have tended to favor the former approach, cautiously welcoming the changes that have occurred and have been promised, while pointing out the need for concrete actions to suit the president’s words. If this is indeed a tipping point in Myanmar’s modern history, and positive change is a real possibility, that seems the very least they can do. Andrew Selth is a Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute in Brisbane, Australia.

Asia Times on Line , October , 29 , 2011

By Andrew Selth

Strategic analysts who studied the Soviet Union during the 1980s can still recall the excitement and intellectual challenge of trying to interpret developments as Mikhail Gorbachev first introduced his policy of perestroika (restructuring), and followed it two years later with glasnost (openness).

As is now well known, there were some diehard Cold Warriors in official and academic circles who steadfastly refused to believe that a creature of the Communist Party, who had enjoyed the patronage of figures like KGB chief Yuri Andropov and risen to the rank of general secretary, would ever challenge the system that nurtured him.

Then there were those experts who, on the basis of a careful analysis of the objective realities, were prepared to give Gorbachev the benefit of the doubt and accept that he was trying to introduce a range of genuine reforms, albeit for his own purposes. Few observers, however, went so far as to predict the downfall of the entire Soviet power structure.

It is useful to keep that period in mind when looking at developments in Myanmar, also known as Burma, since the inauguration of a hybrid civilian-military government this January.

President Thein Sein, a former army general widely believed to have been hand-picked by strongman Senior General Than Shwe, has made several public statements and promised a number of changes that appear to herald a more open-minded and conciliatory approach to government.

There is no question that the armed forces intend to remain firmly in control of Myanmar, but there now appears to be the possibility of greater personal freedoms, rational economic policies and a more relaxed attitude towards the development of civil society.

Thein Sein and his ministers have also taken a number of steps that seem designed in large part to meet the oft-repeated concerns of the international community. For example, the president has met with prominent opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has expressed herself "happy and satisfied" with his intention to introduce "real positive change".

Over 200 political prisoners have been released, a move which addresses - to a certain extent at least - another major sticking point with the Western governments that maintain sanctions against the regime. Myanmar’s ambassador in Vienna has also assured the International Atomic Energy Agency that his country has neither the capacity nor the intention to develop nuclear weapons, long a subject of speculation and concern.

These developments have prompted widely varying reactions. A number of respected academics and commentators have taken a strategic view and, with the usual caveats, sought to highlight what they believe to be the start of a gradual process of political reconciliation and incremental reform.

The International Crisis Group has gone even further and announced that "major reform is under way" in Myanmar. A hard core of activists and their supporters, however, have dismissed recent developments as part of a massive confidence trick by an entrenched military regime. Focusing on more immediate issues, some have even called for harsher economic and financial sanctions against Naypyidaw.

Given the dearth of reliable information about internal developments in Myanmar, and the highly politicized nature of the Myanmar-watching community, this divergence of views is not surprising. In another echo of the Cold War, when the academic community was deeply divided by ideological leanings and different approaches to professional contacts with the communist bloc, scholars and commentators have tended to split into two main camps.

As The Economist opined recently, one sees the glass half full while the other sees the glass half empty. Some exchanges between the two sides have become quite heated, exposing an ugly side to the Myanmar debate.

In the case of the Soviet Union, the optimists were ultimately proven correct, but even they failed to predict the full impact of Gorbachev’s revolutionary policies, and the power of the forces unleashed by his relaxation of the old rules. It is possible that the activist community is right, and the shift in Naypyidaw’s approach is simply a clever ploy to prompt the lifting of economic sanctions and to win Myanmar the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chair in 2014.

Yet, if that is the plan, then Thein Sein seems to have forgotten Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous dictum that the most dangerous time for a dictatorship is when it begins to loosen its grip - for whatever reason. As Gorbachev found, once such a process is set in train, it is very difficult to control.

There is another scenario that needs to be kept in mind. Notwithstanding the opaqueness of Myanmar’s politics, it is known that there are hardliners within the current leadership who oppose Thein Sein’s new approach, particularly his attempts at reconciliation with Aung San Suu Kyi and the pro-democracy movement.

These elements favor continued strong military control of the country and the elimination of any dissent. Myanmar’s armed forces have been remarkably loyal and cohesive over the past 50 years, giving the country the world’s most durable dictatorship. A split in the ruling hierarchy is still unlikely, but if events are seen to be getting out of control an attempt to reinstate direct military rule cannot be ruled out.

Faced with all this uncertainty, the key policy question faced by governments and international organizations is whether to take Thein Sein’s promises at face value and seek to encourage genuine reforms, or to dismiss recent developments as a sham and impose more punitive measures.

To date, most have tended to favor the former approach, cautiously welcoming the changes that have occurred and have been promised, while pointing out the need for concrete actions to suit the president’s words. If this is indeed a tipping point in Myanmar’s modern history, and positive change is a real possibility, that seems the very least they can do.

Andrew Selth is a Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute in Brisbane, Australia.

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