Thaksin’s departure to the UK seems to mark the beginning of an end of the political conflict that we have had in the last few years. The current government, despite its ills, is likely to face less pressure from the public with Thaksin gone. The PAD may continue to press for Samak’s resignation, staging rallies on the streets, but it is likely to receive less and less public support especially as the PAD’s moves become less constructive (like breaking into the NBT TV station!).

The public is tired of political conflict and confrontation. Economic problems also need to be addressed properly and that cannot happen in a highly uncertain political environment. To most non-PAD people’s eyes, there is no obvious benefit of removing the present government. This is why a recent poll also showed that the majority of those surveyed believes the PAD should stop staging a rally against the government.

Most importantly, with Thaksin likely to be absent from Thai politics in the foreseeable future, the anti-Thaksin “elites” (those behind the scene) are happy enough for the moment and may not see the need to push hard for the removal of the present government.

In any case, there are more important things for the Thai public to focus its attention on than the PAD rally. Now is the time for Thais to sit back and think about the political events in the past few years. We need to restart a new wave of political reform.

In 1997, we all hoped that the movement for reform which produced the “People’s Constitution” would lead to more capable, stable and cleaner governments. We were frustrated with the incapable and corrupt politicians and we wanted future governments to be filled with “professional managers” capable of steering the country through many challenges in the globalized world.

Well, that did not really happen. Instead, we witnessed the rise of Thaksin, his recruitment of old-style corrupt politicians, his CEO-like authoritarian style of management and his abusing of power.

What are the lessons we should learn from Thaksin? Based on these lessons, what do we do today and tomorrow to improve the politics of our beloved country?

There is the need to move beyond individuals and the need to put aside one’s hatred or love for Thaksin or Samak. Goals for political reform need to be set and the constitution needs to be amended to achieve these goals.

Unfortunately, the Thai public is currently not focusing its energy on these fundamental issues of how to reform the political system.

What should be the objectives of political reform? The objectives stated in the preface of the 1997 constitution captures the long-term problems in Thai politics very well:

“To promote and protect people’s rights and freedom, to have more people participation in the governing of the country, to examine and check the use of state power, and improve the political structure so that there is greater stability and efficiency…”

We indeed had greater stability with Thaksin’s government staying in power for the full 4-year term and arguably greater degree of efficiency in terms of delivering policies. We apparently also have more people participation (such as the PAD and the pro-Thaksin movement). However, with Thaksin in power, it is clear that we have failed to achieve the objective of examining and checking the use of state power.

This objective of checking the use of state power should be a key issue in the new wave of political reform.

The present constitution does not appropriately addresses this issue and has at least two big problems.

First, the constitution lacks true legitimacy. Despite having been passed by a referendum, the constitution was drafted in a relatively closed political environment. Like most constitutions before the 1997 one, public participation and discussions on the present constitution was extremely limited during the controversial drafting process dictated by the military junta.

It is important to recognize that the referendum does not imply that this constitution is good and acceptable. It merely means that most people thought that the constitution should be “passed”. One might have voted “yes” to pass the constitution for reasons that have nothing to do with the substance of the constitution. For example, one might have voted “yes” simply because he/she thought that Thai politics “should move on”. After all, I doubt if most people who voted had fully read and understood the implications of the constitution draft.

Second, the constitution itself is full of controversial (and “controversial” is my diplomatic selection of word) articles that need to be open to public debate and scrutiny. The articles that the PPP government wants to amend are just a few of the many other articles that need to be reconsidered in this constitution. If there is no change to the constitution, there could be a negative, costly impact on Thai politics soon in the future.

A few important controversial points in this constitution are the election and selection process ad increased power of the Senate, the judiciary branch’s increased power and interference with the legislature branch, the strong tendency of the election rules to produce weak and unstable coalition governments, and the inclusion of the “State’s foundation policy guidance” section that requires a government to follow policies stated in the constitution.

After all, we must keep in mind that a Thai constitution is not a reflection of any ideology or a set of beliefs shared by the Thai citizens. It is simply a product of power struggle between different “forces” in Thai politics. It is a reflection of relative power status and political context in the country in a particular time period. It is not designed to bring happiness and prosperity to the Thai citizens but to allocate and preserve state power among the Thai elites.

This constitution reflects the return of the bureaucratic elites, who had been losing their relative status and power during Thaksin’s reign. They are afraid of another Thaksin figure and wanted to prevent the possibility of another Thaksin rising into power. Thus, the present constitution has been designed to prevent the possibility of a strong executive almost at all costs.

In other words, this constitution is written not for the benefits of the Thai citizens but for certain elite groups whose power and influence have been reduced by Thaksin.

The question of how to reform Thai politics needs to be asked and actively discussed in the public once again. There is no time to waste. Removing the PPP government may satisfy some people’s desire, but it is very unlikely to help improve Thai politics fundamentally. Even if the Democrats are put back into power, Thai politics would not be better than today. After all, the Democrats have been around for so long and they too abused the state power when they are in power. The problem is with the system and we need to fix it there.

Today, whether Thaksin will be brought back here or not, we need to move beyond him, Samak or the PAD. We need to move beyond these individuals to fix the long-term problems of the system.

Today, we need to have the open political environment and active movement for political reform, something similar to the political situation leading to the 1997 constitution. Active, constructive and open public discussions on lessons learned from the Thaksin and post-Thaksin years are urgently needed. The media too needs to start thinking analytically and facilitating a new movement for political reform rather than just merely reporting day-to-day news.

Most of Thai political history has not been about empowering the ordinary Thai citizens. Instead, it has been about power struggle by different groups of the elites – the military, the civil bureaucrats, the corrupt provincial politicians, the old and new capitalists – for their own benefits. We need to change that in the next wave of political reform.