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2. Institutions
There are so many “institutions” in society. Here I will consider three: elections (as a rule of the democratic game), political parties and the judiciary.
In a developed democracy, election results count. No military would bring down an elected government in the So why ask people to vote? Why, as the Nation’s catchy slogan says, “our country, our vote” when elections ultimately do not count if the government is seen as bad by the eyes of the elites. Why make so much fuss about this “live debate” between PPP and Democrats, when eventually election outcomes do not even matter?
Another important problem in Thai democracy is that people go to vote in elections but rarely participate in between elections. Turnout in elections is generally high (over 70% in the last two elections) but non-electoral participation is very low. According to a PhD dissertation which surveyed Thai people in
What happens when non-electoral participation is low? It creates a big gap between people and the government. Communication between the people and the government after elections is minimal. How many times do you communicate with the MPs of your constituency after the election is over? Very seldom or none. This gap between people and the government can possibly be filled by the presence of strong civil society organizations, but as we will see later, civil society in
Let’s turn to political parties. Parties in a developed democracy are based on ideology. Party membership is high and members have alternative candidates to choose from. In Party switching is common and frequent as political factions change party for political and economic advantages (say, new source of funds. Just take a look at what happens after the TRT was dissolved, and also what happened recently when Prachai decided not to give funds to the Machima party candidates. The Machima party is on the verge of breaking down. The Democrat Party is of course the closest to what party should be, but it still has a long way to go. It’s still very much a rather closed party.
When political parties are generally weak and transient, it widens the gap between people and the government, encouraging people to seek strong personalities to fulfill that gap as well as encouraging the elites to intervene.
The judiciary system is also weak. The various independent bodies created by the 1997 Constitution fail to function effectively, providing a motive (or an excuse) for military intervention. The judiciary system still cannot punish corrupt politicians despite ample press coverage. Nobody seems to be offering any good idea on how to re-design the system so that it works. Abhisit keeps saying "vote for the clean, honest candidate" and yet he doesn’t say how his government, if elected, would not be corrupt in the presence of many corrupt "ugly" politicians. How would he deal with the corruption of these political faction bosses without losing their support in a coalition government? It’s Mission Impossible 4. The problem can't be fixed by any honest man. Chuan can't fix it, nor does any saintly figure. If corruption is to be fixed, the system needs to be re-designed (but that is also not enough.. I feel like writing a blog on corruption some time).
(to be continued) |
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