In celebration of my finishing of final exams, and after witnessing a ten-man Tottenham side beating Man City 2-0 at Eastlands, I can’t wait to write a blog which could potentially become a series of blogs.

This blog is a reflection on Thai politics. It seeks to describe and explain what I see as obstacles to the establishment of a true democracy in Thailand. This blog, however, does not provide solutions to these problems. With the belief that good solutions can only come after rigorous analysis of the problems is performed, I certainly hope that this blog will induce us to seriously think about the solutions to our society’s problems. And of course, comments and disagreements are welcomed and appreciated.

The macro framework I usually employ in an analysis of a country’s politics is a rather simple one. Basically, I look at the following 6 variables.

1. Social structure and political culture

2. Institutions – elections, political parties, judiciary, police

3. Social capital and civil society

4. Leadership

5. Economic factors

6. Situational factors

Now I will analyze Thai politics based on this framework.

1. Social structure and political culture

In a traditional Thai society, power and authority were personal rather than institutional. Before the reign of King Chulalongkorn, there was no established formal centralized authority in Siam. Territory was vaguely defined, not by border lines, but by the ability of the prevailing ruler in drawing personal support and respect from other local rulers in the hinterland. The ruler’s personality mattered a great deal.

Often, each of the traditional rulers in Siam, and in Southeast Asia society in general, sought to legitimize his rule by associating himself with a major creed of the world, such as Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism, so as to portray himself as possessing extraordinary and semi-divine power superior than others. With the absence of the state in the modern sense, personal, patron-client ties were thus at the heart of traditional Thai society. Indeed, patron-client ties have continued to be important in present-day Thailand.

The next most important fact to highlight here is the political and economic division of Thailand. While the majority of the wealth is in Bangkok, the majority of the votes are in the provinces. To be more specific, the Northeast – the poorest region in Thailand – is also the region with the most number of parliamentary seats.

As Anek noted in his famous piece “A Tale of Two Democracies”, the urban middle class and the rural population have contrasting expectations of politicians, elections and the government. While the educated middle class wants honest politicians and a clean government capable of leading the country in the globalized world (say they may want someone like Abhisit), the main concern of the rural voters is to draw attention and resources away from Bangkok and into the provinces. The rural population, many of whom have been neglected or underserved by the state’s social services, is more dependent on patron-client ties than the urban middle class, the majority of whom are white-collar workers with relatively decent earnings.

The large economic and social urban-rural inequality has led to different political behaviors among the urban and rural populations. While the educated urban middle class votes on the basis of sound policies and national interests, the rural voters vote for whoever could bring greater benefits into the rural areas (30 baht healthcare, village funds, OTOP).

The two groups’ views on corruption are also different. While the educated middle class has a strong demand for good governance and are intolerable of corruption practices, the rural voters are “ok” with corruption as long as beneficial policies are delivered to them.

Let me also make it clear that the line between urban-rural is not that simple. There are urban poor as well as there are economically well-off rural voters. So, the term “urban” here should refer to people who have relatively well-off, have good access to public (and private) services and thus are relatively free from patron-client ties. The term “rural” should refer to people who are relatively poor, have limited access to public services, and thus are dependent on patron-client ties to provide them with security in life.

As a result of the political and economic division, parliamentary democracy in Thailand, which really only began in 1988, may produce an elected government that is not the preferred choice of the urban middle class. Chatichai government was dubbed the “Buffet Cabinet” for it is so easy for the cabinet members to “eat”, while Banharn government was dubbed the “Fast Food Cabinet.” Chavalit government, which won a lot of support in the Northeast, was also accused of its inability to manage the economy.

Moreover, parliamentary democracy in Thailand also produces elected provincial politicians whom the educated middle class would disapprove of (the middle class would refer to these politicians as “yee” or ugly).

Indeed there are a lot of these “ugly” corrupt politicians in the government and some of the factional bosses get rewards by being given ministerial positions in return for the seats they win for the party. Even in a relatively clean government of Chuan, a lot of these “ugly” politicians were present. In the next government, whether formed around the PPP or the Democrats, these “ugly” politicians will still be present.

These “ugly” politicians, elected from the provinces, are often seen by the urban middle class as corrupt and incapable politicians whose main concerns are simply to get rich (and also channel state resources to the provinces so that they can get reelected).

What happens when the middle class is unhappy with a corrupt, inefficient government full of these “ugly” politicians? Well, first they will criticize. The press will write about it; the academics will talk about it; and soon the usually coalition government will become unstable and will eventually come down after facing a no-confidence debate. With the Thaksin case, however, no-confidence debate was not possible, paving way for unconstitutional intervention by the elites.

This brings us to another important and obvious political culture in Thailand: the military elites have strong tendency to intervene in Thai politics. From 1932-72, most of the PMs were military generals. During this period, the Thai state did not develop along parliamentary line and power and state resources were shared among competing cliques of the bureaucratic elites. It was only in the 1980s that we witnessed the rise of the provincial businessmen who would become the new rising force in politics. Thus, we had demi-democracy in the 1980s, with General Prem leading the government comprising military generals as well as provincial businessmen-politicians as the country made a transition toward parliamentary democracy.

With parliamentary democracy, the elites still play important role in politics. The military intervened in 1991 by staging a coup against a corrupt government. Then, after 1992 “Black May”, the military was sent back to its barracks, depoliticized. Yet in 2006, the generals intervened again even when democratic election was about to take place. That election very likely would have seen Thaksin back in power because the majority of Thais would still vote for Thai Rak Thai. The military elites were not happy with that probable outcome and so they intervened again, much to the delight of the Bangkok middle class (and, I would contend, much to the despair of the rural mass and the MAJORITY of Thais). This is very different from a developed democracy in which the army is highly professional and never intervenes in politics.

Indeed, the Bangkok military (and business) elites continue to dictate Thai politics even under parliamentary democracy. Bangkok is Thailand, Thailand is Bangkok, period. And here we go again: "Let’s vote in the coming elections. Vote for good and honest party." Well, one might wonder: I did vote the last time, but where is that elected government now?

(to be continued)